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ABSTRACT
Background Over the past decade, acute kidney injury 
(AKI) has become a global priority for improving patient 
safety and health outcomes. In the UK, a confidential 
inquiry into AKI led to the publication of clinical guidance 
and a range of policy initiatives. National patient safety 
directives have focused on the mandatory establishment 
of clinical decision support systems (CDSSs) within all 
acute National Health Service (NHS) trusts to improve the 
detection, alerting and response to AKI. We studied the 
organisational work of implementing AKI CDSSs within 
routine hospital care.
Methods An ethnographic study comprising non- 
participant observation and interviews was conducted in 
two NHS hospitals, delivering AKI quality improvement 
programmes, located in one region of England. Three 
researchers conducted a total of 49 interviews and 
150 hours of observation over an 18- month period. 
Analysis was conducted collaboratively and iteratively 
around emergent themes, relating to the organisational 
work of technology adoption.
Results The two hospitals developed and implemented 
AKI CDSSs using very different approaches. Nevertheless, 
both resulted in adaptive work and trade- offs relating to 
the technology, the users, the organisation and the wider 
system of care. A common tension was associated with 
attempts to maximise benefit while minimise additional 
burden. In both hospitals, resource pressures exacerbated 
the tensions of translating AKI recommendations into 
routine practice.
Conclusions Our analysis highlights a conflicted 
relationship between external context (policy and 
resources), and organisational structure and culture (eg, 
digital capability, attitudes to quality improvement). 
Greater consideration is required to the long- term 
effectiveness of the approaches taken, particularly in light 
of the ongoing need for adaptation to incorporate new 
practices into routine work.
InTRoduCTIon
Over the past decade, acute kidney injury 
(AKI) has become a global priority for 
improving patient safety and health 
outcomes.1–4 AKI is a common and 
serious clinical syndrome characterised 
by sudden reduction in kidney function. 
It has many causes but most often occurs 
during episodes of acute illness such 
as gastroenteritis or influenza.1 5 AKI 
complicates approximately 6% of all 
hospital admissions, and is associated with 
significant morbidity and high levels of 
mortality.2 6 7 The associated healthcare 
costs are substantial; in England, hospital 
AKI- related care alone accounts for 
around 1% of the total National Health 
Service (NHS) budget (£1.02 billion).8
In the UK, the 2009 National Confi-
dential Inquiry into Patient Outcome and 
Death (NCEPOD) report on AKI, Adding 
Insult to Injury, found that up to one in 
five episodes of AKI were avoidable and 
only 50% of care associated with AKI 
could be considered ‘good’.9 The report 
highlighted poor assessment of acute 
illness with delays in the recognition of 
AKI.9 To address identified gaps in quality 
and safety, a range of national initia-
tives were introduced including guide-
lines and quality standards.5 10–12 NHS 
England established the ‘Think Kidneys’ 
programme to improve care in hospital 
and community settings.13 A major driver 
for change has been the introduction 
of a mandatory NHS England Patient 
Safety Directive, which came into effect 
in March 2015. This required all NHS 
Acute and Foundation Trusts in England 
to implement a computerised algorithm 
within laboratory information manage-
ment systems (LIMS) to standardise 
the identification of AKI.12 14 Locating 
the algorithm within the hospital LIMS 
was intended to enable integration with 
patient records, permit extraction of data 
to be sent to the UK Renal Registry and 
facilitate future roll- out to primary care. 
All major LIMS providers committed to 





ber 5, 2019 at The Librarian Centre for Health
http://qualitysafety.bmj.com/
BM
J Qual Saf: first published as 10.1136/bmjqs-2019-009932 on 3 December 2019. Downloaded from 
2 Bailey S, et al. BMJ Qual Saf 2019;0:1–8. doi:10.1136/bmjqs-2019-009932
Original research
Table 1 Data collection
Hospital X Hospital Y
Interviews (total) 24 25
  Managers 6 7
  Clinicians 8 5
  Nurses 4 9
  Pharmacists 0 1
  Patients 6* 3
*One interview was conducted with patient and carer together.
providing the algorithm on a commercially available 
LIMS by July 2014.15 This was followed in 2016 by 
a further patient safety directive requiring all NHS 
providers to ‘develop an action plan’ to ‘improve local 
systems and processes for the care of patients with 
AKI’.12 14 16 17
Based on an international classification system 
for AKI, it is recommended that a “clinical decision 
support system” (CDSS) comprises three phases: a 
detection phase entailing installation of the national 
algorithm resulting in generation of AKI warning stage 
test results; an alerting phase entailing communication 
of warning stage test results to relevant clinical teams 
(ie, an e- alert); and a response phase to ensure an AKI 
warning stage test result is placed in clinical context 
leading to accurate diagnosis and effective manage-
ment.1 14 18
The implementation of CDSSs is regarded by policy 
makers as important in reducing both variation and 
costs in care.19 Research has highlighted that the intro-
duction of CDDSs may impact on workforce planning 
through ‘new roles, new organisational functions and 
considerable management time’.20 There remain gaps 
in our understanding of how new CDSSs are inte-
grated into the ‘workflow’, across diverse settings and 
at what cost.21 22 Being mindful of the relationship 
between recommended practice (work- as- imagined) 
and everyday clinical work (work- as- done) is increas-
ingly recognised as an approach to improve resilience 
and safety in healthcare settings.23–25 As defined by 
Hollnagel, ‘Work- As- Imagined…describes what should 
happen under normal working conditions. Work- As- 
Done…on the other hand, describes what actually 
happens, how work unfolds over time in complex 
contexts’.25 Through studying the implementation of 
AKI CDSSs, using ethnographic methods, we explored 
the professional and organisational work surrounding 
the translation of policy drivers and clinical guidance 
into routine hospital care.
MeThodS
Setting
This paper describes the implementation of two AKI 
CDSSs at neighbouring NHS hospital trusts in England. 
Both trusts were teaching hospitals with tertiary renal 
services and provided acute and specialist services to a 
mixed urban patient population of around 1.5 million 
people. Both hospitals had capacity of over 800 beds. 
They had each made improvements to AKI identifi-
cation and management in the past and sought to 
use the introduction of the algorithm as an opportu-
nity to formalise and focus on these programmes of 
ongoing work. The research was undertaken as part 
of the National Institute for Health Research Collab-
oration for Leadership in Applied Health Research 
and Care Greater Manchester. Both hospitals were 
existing partners in the collaboration, and the protocol 
for the study was developed collaboratively between 
researchers and partners.
Both hospitals mobilised aspects of quality improve-
ment (QI) methodologies set out by the Institute for 
Healthcare Improvement (IHI).26 However, they took 
different approaches and used them in different ways. 
Hospital X adopted the Breakthrough Series Collab-
orative approach (hereafter: ‘collaborative’), while 
in Hospital Y a ‘change agent’ approach was taken 
through the employment of AKI specialist nurses 
combined with an IHI- informed programme of system 
redesign. These differing approaches underscored 
the rationale for the research, in offering contrasting 
approaches to the implementation of a nationally 
mandated programme. At the same time the aims and 
objectives of each programme were broadly similar, 
with both sites including similar outcomes and process 
measures. It was the iterative process of developing a 
system for coordinating the alert that became the focus 
of research at each site.
data collection
The study took an ethnographic approach comprising 
observations and semistructured interviews within 
the two hospital trusts (see table 1). Over the course 
of an 18- month period between November 2015 
and September 2017, a total of 49 interviews were 
conducted with key personnel involved in the imple-
mentation process, and patients who had received 
care at one of the two sites. The research team also 
recorded around 150 hours of observations.
Data collection in each site was driven by an explor-
atory ethnographic inquiry into ‘how things are done 
around here’.27 Researchers began by constructing a 
detailed account of the approach taken to QI in each 
site, and the formal and informal organisational condi-
tions in which this approach was situated. This provided 
the basis for examining the different kinds of work 
involved in doing improvement.28 In Hospital X, data 
collection commenced just as the collaborative phase of 
the QI programme was launched. This was a 12- month 
programme built around ‘Plan- Do- Study- Act’ (PDSA) 
cycles and comprising bimonthly collective learning 
events interspersed with ward- based testing and feedback 
events. These events comprised the main component of 
the research observation. Interviews were conducted 
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Box 1 Hospital X—AKI care bundle
Hospital X
Acute kidney injury (AKI)
Care Process Bundle
Investigate for cause of AKI; for example, sepsis or 
obstruction
Urine dipstick test within 24 hours of first AKI alert
Fluid balance assessment
Stop ACE inhibitors and ARBs**, and pharmacy 
medication review within 24 hours of first AKI alert
Serum creatinine test repeated within 24 hours of first 
AKI alert
Ultrasound scan of urinary tract within 24 hours of first 
AKI alert
Specialist renal or critical care discussion within 12 hours 
of first AKI alert
Written self- management information prior to discharge
*ACE inhibitor and angiotensin II receptor blockers (ARBs): 
pharmaceutical drugs used in the treatment of hypertension.
first with key clinical and managerial personnel asso-
ciated with the QI programme and then with clinical 
ward staff. These interviews were used to situate the QI 
programme in context from a variety of perspectives and 
explore perceived barriers and facilitators to its progress. 
In Hospital Y the QI work had been piloted prior to data 
collection and a ‘spread’ phase was being undertaken by 
two specialist AKI nurses. Data collection began with 
interviews and conversations with the nurses and the 
associated team in order to reconstruct the improve-
ment process. A snowballing approach was then taken 
to identify further relevant interviewees, with whom to 
explore different perspectives on the process. Obser-
vations comprised shadowing the specialist nurses and 
observing their interactions with ward- based teams. All 
interviews were digitally recorded, securely transcribed 
and anonymised.
data analysis
In line with accepted conventions of ethnographic 
research, analysis took place on an iterative basis 
throughout data collection, with each new interview 
or observation informing the next.29 Observational and 
interview notes were recorded in journals and discussed 
at regular team meetings. Emergent themes were iden-
tified and incorporated into interview topic guides, 
increasing focus as data collection progressed. Inter-
view transcriptions were thematically analysed in order 
to develop a contextualised account of the implemen-
tation processes according to the observed differences 
between approaches to improvement, and the rela-
tionship between internal and external environment. 
Building on previous studies of CDSSs, our focus was 
on the ‘work’ of adaptation that characterises the adop-
tion of new technology.20 Analysis drew our attention 
to a complex relationship between the objectives of AKI 
policy, the technology mobilised to accomplish them 
and the resources available to organisations to support 
the introduction of the new system. Here, we theorise 
this relationship by drawing on the relationship between 
work- as- imagined and work- as- done.25
ReSulTS
Within the time frame of our study both hospitals 
documented some success in relation to their outcome 
and process targets. Monitoring and reporting of these 
outcomes was undertaken internally by each trust, 
and is reported in the study research report.30 Our 
data collection and analysis focused on the process of 
implementation.
Though the two trusts had contrasting approaches 
to the implementation of AKI policies and guidance, 
a common tension experienced in both settings was 
finding a balance between the benefit and the burden 
associated with the introduction of new systems. The 
following sections describe the unfolding approaches 
to introducing an AKI CDSS and how, in both hospi-
tals, resource pressures, particularly on ward- staffing 
levels, exacerbated the tensions of translating recom-
mendations into routine and sustainable practice.
different approaches to introducing an AKI CdSS
Hospital X—collaborative approach
The approach of Hospital X was based on IHI 
collaborative methodology but had been adapted to 
fit the organisation’s structure and culture. The IHI 
method emphasises incorporating learning into day- 
to- day working routines. There was an established 
history of QI work at Hospital X prior to the AKI 
programme, with a dedicated QI team. They claimed 
to have an ‘improvement culture’ which included a 
set of norms, values and ‘ways of doing things’. A 
critical part of the ‘collaborative’ methodology was 
the development of ‘tests of change’, which are small, 
practical techniques that wards developed iteratively 
through PDSA cycles.
Hospital X’s AKI collaborative included an AKI 
working group, with clinicians from nephrology, 
acute medical and intensive care, and representatives 
from pharmacy, nursing, information technology, 
biochemistry, and the QI team. Ten wards took part 
in the collaborative, which was based around five 
‘learning sessions’ held between August 2015 and 
December 2016. The aim of the collaborative was 
to develop and test a series of ward- based changes, 
to be developed into a ‘change package’ and spread 
to the rest of the hospital following the collaborative 
programme.
A key element of the collaborative learning sessions 
was for each ward team to consider how they would 
ensure appropriate actions in the response phase 
following an AKI e- alert. The care bundle (see box 1) 
drew directly on national guidance (see table 2).13 At 
the start of the collaborative, learning sessions were 
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Table 2 Summary of acute kidney injury (AKI) quality standard and statements, process measures and core elements of a care 
bundle5 10 13 42
NICE
Quality standard for
 AKI (QS76) 2014
Advancing quality
AKI clinical process measures 2015
Think Kidneys
Core elements of AKI care bundle
2015
Statement 1: People who are at risk of acute 
kidney injury are made aware of the potential 
causes.
Statement 2: People who present with an 
illness with no clear acute component and one 
or more indications or risk factors for acute 
kidney injury are assessed for this condition.
Statement 3: People in hospital who are at 
risk of acute kidney injury have their serum 
creatinine level and urine output monitored.
Statement 4: People have a urine dipstick 
test performed as soon as acute kidney injury is 
suspected or detected.
Statement 5: People with acute kidney 
injury have the management of their condition 
discussed with a nephrologist as soon as 
possible, and within 24 hours of detection, if 
they are at risk of intrinsic renal disease or 
have stage III acute kidney injury or a renal 
transplant.
Statement 6: People with acute kidney injury 
who meet the criteria for renal replacement 
therapy are referred immediately to a 
nephrologist or critical care specialist.
AKI-01 Urine dipstick test within 24 hours of first 
AKI alert
AKI-02 Stop ACE inhibitor and angiotensin receptor 
blockers (ARBs) within 24 hours of first AKI alert
AKI-03 Serum creatinine test repeated within 
24 hours of first AKI alert
AKI-04 Ultrasound scan within 24 hours of first alert
AKI-05 Specialist renal/critical care discussion within 
12 hours of first AKI alert
AKI-06 Give patients written self- management 
information prior to discharge
AKI-07 Pharmacy medication review—data 
collection measure only
Initial assessment ABCDE as assessment* 
(follow NICE CG50†)
observations—check NEWS Score‡
Look for signs of sepsis Abdominal palpation 
looking for full bladder
Initial treatment
Prompt treatment of sepsis (start Sepsis Six care 
bundle)
Fluid challenges if hypovolaemic/hypotensive
Medication review
Stop potentially harmful drugs
Check for dose adjustments in AKI
Relieve obstruction (see guidance)
*A method for assessing each of a patient’s vital systems—Airway, Breathing, Circulation, Disability and Exposure.
†https://www.nice.org.uk/guidance/cg50
‡National Early Warning Score: https://www.england.nhs.uk/ourwork/clinical-policy/sepsis/nationalearlywarningscore/.
NICE, National Institute for Clinical Excellence.
scheduled for a full day. As time progressed and the 
organisation faced mounting staffing pressures, atten-
dance at learning sessions diminished. In response to 
these pressures and the effect they were having on the 
time ward staff could dedicate to the collaborative, 
the QI team shortened learning sessions to half a day. 
This reduction in time resulted in changes to the focus 
of the sessions. Much of what had been included in 
the previous sessions, such as team- building exercises, 
extended periods for sharing ideas, patient narratives 
and group discussion were dropped. This meant that 
the ongoing monitoring and reporting of data made 
up the majority of the agenda. Furthermore, the plan 
for spreading the change package had to be delayed in 
light of staffing pressures.
Hospital Y—change agent approach
In 2011, Hospital Y undertook an internal audit of 
AKI services to compare the findings to the NCEPOD 
report findings.9 The audit found widespread varia-
bility between wards with regards AKI detection and 
management, which led to the formation in 2013 
of an Acute Kidney Team. This consisted of three 
nephrologists, an intensivist, an acute physician, a 
part- time renal nurse specialist, a renal pharmacist 
and an IT developer. The team worked collabora-
tively on designing an improvement framework and 
IT system to better manage AKI and provided quar-
terly reports to the Trust Board through the medical 
director. A steering group and working group 
established a business case for AKI nurse specialist 
funding. Between 2014 and 2015, the hospital 
undertook a 12- month programme of IHI- informed 
improvement education, in which key personnel 
involved in the AKI work designed and piloted 
an AKI intervention. Specific objectives of the QI 
project were to ensure: prompt recognition of AKI 
within 24 hours; appropriate medication reviews; 
appropriate fluid management; and adherence to all 
aspects of a checklist.
The intervention was tested using a factorial design 
on four wards with the support of one AKI nurse 
specialist for this period. Through use of PDSA cycles, 
the pilot focused on testing various combinations of 
improvement activities, leading to a set of interven-
tions that could be spread hospital- wide. This included 
the development of a priority checklist for completion 
by ward staff for all cases of AKI (see box 2). As a 
result, by the time the NHS England Patient Safety 
Directive was mandated, Hospital Y had already devel-
oped its own AKI CDSS. In March 2015, informed by 
the findings from the pilot, two AKI nurse specialists 
were appointed on an ongoing basis to support spread 
across all wards.





ber 5, 2019 at The Librarian Centre for Health
http://qualitysafety.bmj.com/
BM
J Qual Saf: first published as 10.1136/bmjqs-2019-009932 on 3 December 2019. Downloaded from 
5Bailey S, et al. BMJ Qual Saf 2019;0:1–8. doi:10.1136/bmjqs-2019-009932
Original research
Box 2 Hospital Y—Priority Care Checklist
Hospital Y
Acute kidney injury (AKI)
Priority Care Checklist
Ascertain baseline creatinine
Identify cause for AKI
Perform fluid assessment
Investigate for cause and consequences
Consider catheterisation
Renal and bladder ultrasound scan
Consider referral to renal
Fluid balance charts
Perform and document urine dipstick
Perform drug review
AKI detection, alerting and response: contrasting 
approaches
Detection to alerting
Hospital X adopted the national algorithm for 
detecting potential cases of AKI. The collaborative 
invested considerable work to set up an effective 
system that could be integrated into the electronic 
patient record. They expected that the e- alert would 
trigger actions that would be implemented by staff to 
halt the progression of AKI and provide clear advice to 
non- renal specialists about the referral pathway. The 
e- alert appeared in the record’s demographic banner, 
which is a constant ‘header’ on the computer screen 
when clinical staff interact with a patient’s medical 
record. Additionally, the e- alert was accompanied by 
a phone call from biochemistry to the ward where the 
blood sample had been taken for every new AKI stage 
3 result.
Hospital Y implemented their own internally devel-
oped AKI algorithm, which was more sensitive than 
the national algorithm, which they claimed eradicated 
underdetection. One of the consequences of this was 
increased overidentification. Using their own system, 
Hospital Y estimated a prevalence of approximately 
5% overidentification. Against this, they observed 
approximately 10% underidentification of true AKIs 
using the national system. They chose to accept over-
detection because the nurse specialists were on hand to 
assess all cases and could discount any cases that they 
felt were not valid.
In contrast to Hospital X, Hospital Y did not have a 
fully integrated electronic patient record. In Hospital 
X the e- alert was present in the demographic banner at 
all times, whereas in Hospital Y the e- alert was associ-
ated with the blood results software on the computer, 
away from the paper notes. Therefore, in Hospital Y 
the nurse specialists were a dedicated resource that 
placed the AKI warning stage test result in the clin-
ical context, checking and correcting any inaccura-
cies produced by the detection algorithm. The nurse 
specialists attached stickers to the notes of each patient 
with AKI; with sticker colours coded to alert nursing 
staff, doctors and pharmacists to relevant sections. 
To ensure that the information was being communi-
cated effectively, the nurse specialists conducted daily 
ward rounds. In effect, the nurses in Hospital Y acted 
as a human alert to the AKI e- alert. In Hospital X, 
in an effort to reduce missing patients, pharmacists 
performed a medication review for all the AKI e- alerts.
Alerting to response
In Hospital X, once an alert had been triggered, a 
list of tasks described in the ‘AKI bundle’ (see box 1) 
would then need to be completed for every suspected 
case of AKI. The bundle process was built into the 
electronic record, but the AKI working group decided 
not to make completion mandatory because they were 
worried about alert fatigue (that is, a failure to engage 
with digital prompts) and of adding to the bureaucratic 
burden faced by ward staff in their day- to- day work.31 
This meant the working group had to think of alter-
native ways to ensure the checklist was completed. 
They assumed that the majority of nurses and clini-
cians would complete the checklist. In reality however, 
the checklist was completed in a minority of all the 
recorded AKI cases, as the following quote illustrates:
I see junior doctors, for example, working on the 
computer and pop- ups will appear repeatedly alerting 
them to various things, they definitely don’t read them. 
They just regard it as an annoyance and a nuisance 
and they skip over it as fast as they can. (Manager 1—
Hospital X)
During the initial period of Hospital X’s collabora-
tive, a nurse on the ward was nominated as the AKI 
coordinator each day to ensure there was distributed 
responsibility. The objective of the AKI coordinator 
was to ensure that the AKI care bundle (see box 1) 
was completed and, as such, the system was reliant on 
the coordinator role. However, despite the initial idea 
of distributed responsibility, the AKI coordinator role 
was often left to the ward coordinator. This suggests 
that the care bundle was not a process that was simply 
absorbed into other clinical practices but something 
that required additional time in the process of care to 
be completed. In addition, the existence of multiple, 
simultaneous QI programmes, and other increasingly 
competing demands on ward staff, created a tension 
for staff as to where to focus their time.
People were very eager to take part and went out 
thinking we're going to do this, that and that. And 
then they realised that they didn't have actually the 
capacity to do it in terms of time and people… So the 
AKI work is not just one on its own, there are a lot 
more [quality improvement] projects ongoing already. 
And they just feel like they don't have time to do any…
and they have to look after patients really. (Manager 
2—Hospital X)
A key challenge in Hospital Y was the concentra-
tion of expertise among relatively few people and 
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the ongoing resource dependency this created. This 
person- dependent approach called for the hand-
over of critical information that required the nurse 
specialists to negotiate boundaries between specialist/
generalist and nurse/doctor orientations. Although 
front- line staff still received alerts directly on elec-
tronic reporting systems, the specialist nurses regu-
larly attended each ward in person in order to provide 
guidance and to prompt appropriate actions. Despite 
the importance of this face- to- face communication, 
there was a limit to what the specialist nurses could 
continue to monitor and, if needed, intervene (there 
being only two covering the entire hospital). This 
caused problems because the specialist nurses did not 
have sufficient time to provide continued monitoring 
and support across the hospital, which in turn added 
a further burden to ward personnel who were already 
struggling with understaffing.
dISCuSSIon
Through an ethnographic approach, this paper set out 
to examine the relationship between the objectives of 
AKI policy, the technologies mobilised to accomplish 
these, and the resources available to organisations to 
support the change. Being mindful of the relationship 
between work- as- imagined and work- as- done,25 our 
findings describe three key factors shaping this rela-
tionship:
1. The fitness for purpose of the technology:
The national algorithm resulted in both overdetection 
and underdetection of AKI.12 14 Our findings raise ques-
tions about the ‘fit’ of a simple algorithmic approach 
to the management of a diagnosis such as AKI. AKI is 
characterised by indeterminacy and is reliant on ongo-
ing human interpretation and judgement. Our findings 
illustrate two ways technology and human resource can 
be coordinated to manage AKI but emphasises that there 
are ongoing consequences of doing so for professionals 
and managers.32 33
2. The work of making the technology fit for practice:
The problems caused by the potential for both overdi-
agnosis and underdiagnosis shaped the development of 
two different systems. Hospital Y developed its own al-
gorithm that eradicated underdetection and contained 
overdiagnosis through daily manual checking of all pos-
sible cases by the nurse specialists. This may provide a 
safer and more reliable approach but requires significant 
ongoing investment. Hospital X sought to reduce the 
risks of overdiagnosis and underdiagnosis through the 
use of automated prompts to staff via its integrated re-
cord as well as by integrating the alert into daily ward 
routines and providing a pharmacy review of all possible 
cases. As underdiagnosis is by definition a ‘missed case’ 
(ie, something to which the algorithm does not alert) the 
Hospital X measures represent mitigation rather than 
eradication.
3. The consequences of this work for ongoing planning and 
resource use:
Hospital Y was dependent on the continued availability 
of resources to support the employment of a dedicated 
AKI nurse specialist team. This was being challenged 
within the time of our study, with pressures demanding 
their time in other areas. Hospital X faced challenges 
retaining engagement throughout the collaborative pro-
gramme, and this looked set to be exacerbated by the 
launching of new improvement programmes. Resonating 
with previous CDSS research, which highlights the need 
for ongoing resources,20 these factors put the sustainabil-
ity of any changes in question.
Together these factors point to a key challenge 
associated with the attempt to maximise the utility of 
AKI as a driver for safe and effective care while mini-
mising additional burden for patients and healthcare 
staff. Additional work represents a cost in terms of 
time and a reallocation of resources from elsewhere, 
and this complicates the ongoing task of prioritisation 
by hospital leaders. This undermines the persistent 
assumption of ‘resource neutrality’34 embedded in 
improvement methodologies and actioned through 
policy. Some of this resource cost was made visible 
through the design and delivery of the improvement 
programmes in each hospital. For example, in Hospital 
Y, the decision was taken to trade an increased rate 
of overdetection for eradication of underdetection. 
Hospital X faced a trade- off between the greater reli-
ability that might have come from making the care 
bundle mandatory through the electronic record and 
the bureaucratic burden that they feared by doing this. 
This last point illustrates a broader concern with the 
introduction of new technology involving trade- offs 
between efficacy and sustainability.35
Other problems became visible to the research team 
as unintended consequences associated with either the 
technology or the work undertaken to incorporate it 
into routine practice. A key example was the issue of 
‘alert fatigue’,31 36 37 which was observed in our study 
when junior doctors ignored the many ‘pop- ups’ they 
routinely received. Resonating with our findings, 
Kanagasundaram et al (2016) found that a mandated 
response to an AKI alert ‘irritated’ clinicians with 
limited engagement in the functionality of the CDSS.36 
Their evaluation indicated that staff found ways to 
bypass alerts, which ‘simply hid it until the next time a 
patient’s chart was accessed’. Furthermore, credibility 
of the CDSS could be ‘strained’ when the detection 
was deemed to be too sensitive.36
There are known issues regarding the accuracy of 
CDSSs which can create organisational problems in the 
additional work required to adapt to and resolve issues 
created by the technology in use.20 35 The problem of 
alert fatigue demonstrates that technologies can alter 
clinical work in a manner not always well received by 
clinicians.38 Therefore we find a tension here between 
algorithmic and clinician judgements, in which there 
are both sanctioned and unsanctioned instances of 
clinicians overriding the system, respectively, to resolve 
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inaccuracies, or through fatigued failure to act. We draw 
attention to two organisational problems that result: 
first, if a CDSS prompts both sanctioned and unsanc-
tioned activities on the part of professionals, then this 
complicates the formal organisation of work and the 
ability to create an auditable account of that work. 
Second, if errors occur as a result of the inaccuracies of a 
CDSS, then the question of how to reconstruct a process 
of care with clearly demarcated domains of responsi-
bility becomes problematic. Within the concept of alert 
fatigue we therefore find a significant challenge to the 
maintenance of safe and transparent standards.
Focusing on ‘work as done’ helps to make the 
various workarounds associated with successive 
changes to systems visible and suggests that a dysfunc-
tional effect might result from the accumulated adap-
tations necessary to embed changes into working 
routines.39 Both Hospital X and Hospital Y raised 
concerns about the shifting of resources and priori-
ties towards new areas of improvement prior to the 
completion of their programmes of work focused on 
the AKI CDSS. Beneath the rhetoric of the ‘improve-
ment culture’ talked about in Hospital X we found 
evidence of ‘improvement fatigue’ as the demands of 
multiple consecutive programmes of improvement 
created challenges for QI managers engaging staff, 
and compounded existing staffing pressures. This 
is of particular concern if new programmes result in 
the adoption of practices which conflict with those 
adopted as part of a previous programme, as this will 
ultimately put in question the sustainability of any 
changes. If adaptations to technologies complicate the 
formal organisation of responsibilities in the provi-
sion of safe and transparent care, then this presents 
a sustainability challenge which is systemic in nature. 
Further research is required concerning the possible 
displacement of responsibility caused by the introduc-
tion of computerised decision support systems.
The study had limitations related to its ethnographic 
design, which permitted us in- depth but partial access 
to the two sites. Our access was granted via the QI 
team, which meant that accessing staff who were 
unsupportive of the QI work, or unaware or critical 
of AKI was more difficult. The two hospitals were at 
different points in their improvement programmes, 
and the degree of access permitted in Hospital X 
was greater than in Hospital Y, therefore the findings 
cannot be treated as strictly comparative.
ConCluSIonS
AKI is a clinical syndrome that is of relevance to a range 
of patients and across all clinical settings. As such, exam-
ining AKI- related work provides an important exemplar 
for the implementation of system- wide CDSSs.22 Our 
findings contribute to a growing literature surrounding 
CDSSs in which there is a recognised need to ‘go beyond’ 
usability testing by broadening the evidence base to 
take into account the social, cultural and institutional 
influences that impact adoption of CDSSs.39 40 Often, 
the introduction of something new into a complex 
system initiates a process of adaptations and trade- offs, 
referred to as ‘workarounds’.23 41 Our findings show that 
such workarounds (which include the decision to ignore 
alerts altogether) complicate the formal organisation of 
care, which requires clear demarcations of responsibility. 
As the implementation of CDSS is increasing rapidly, 
our findings suggest that attention is required to the 
work required to make CDSS work- in- practice, and the 
actions and opinions of key stakeholders with regards 
to its use. Given the difficulty of making an automated 
technology visible to human intervention, the increasing 
use of CDSS requires a re- examinination of the formal 
standards for making work accountable.
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